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1 
I. Introduction 
Policymakers contemplating large scale restructuring of politically sensitive sectors of the 
economy typically have only a limited window of political opportunity in which to implement 
their reforms (Keeler, 1993). This paper presents a theoretical framework that aims to assist 
policymakers in maximizing the returns from such opportunities. While a growing body of 
theoretical evidence (Megginson et. al., 1994) supports the claim that privatization can yield 
substantial productivity gains, the difficulties inherent in privatizing monopolies have also been 
repeatedly uncovered (Ramamurti, 1996 and Levy & Spiller, 1996). Policymakers committed to 
enhancing the efficiency of state-owned enterprises but wary of public recrimination for failed 
privatizations have myriads of often contradictory theoretical approaches and arguments to 
consider in their policy design. This paper highlights the potential for combining three such 
frameworks that share their origins in The New Institutional Economics. It argues that a nuanced 
combination of agency, property rights and transaction cost theory helps explain the successes 
and failures of New Zealand’s experience with state owned enterprise reform with special 
reference to the utility sector.2  
This new institutional approach to public sector reform is consistent with a large body of 
recent theoretical and empirical work from the ‘public management’ perspective. However, it 
may also be feasible to extend the framework presented here to address the added concerns 
voiced within the ‘public governance’ perspective (Kooiman, 1993; Kickert, 1997). First, the 
new institutional approach can encompass the need to guard legality and legitimacy as suggested 
by the inclusion of probity (Williamson, 1999). Public networks or interrelated transactions may 
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be used as the unit of analysis as demonstrated in the private sector by Nickerson and Silverman 
(1997). Such extensions are beyond the scope of this article that seeks to summarize an emerging 
underlying theoretical framework for the ‘public management’ perspective on public sector 
reform.
Successful reform efforts must get the incentives and property rights right but they must 
also tackle the difficult contracting issues surrounding the reform of many state sector activities. 
In short, they must get the regulatory governance structure right as well. While this analytical 
framework was proposed by Williamson (1996), recent theoretical and empirical contributions by 
Levy and Spiller (1996) and Heller and McCubbins (1996) and others have allowed for an 
operationalization of this next stage of reform design. The central tenet is that government’s must 
take advantage of whatever mechanisms they have at their disposal -- either an independent 
judiciary or regulatory rules and procedures -- which can best provide a credible commitment 
against interference in the day-to-day operations of an enterprise. In Section III, evidence will be 
presented that New Zealand’s institutional environment offered limited credibility for regulatory 
rules and procedures but was relatively more efficient at providing commitment to privatized 
firms through contract. However, their privatization program foundered when the government 
failed to sufficiently consider the hazards involved in transferring highly politicized transactions 
produced using technologies characterized by substantial economies of scale and scope and 
requiring large quantities of sunk assets from the public to the private sector. Section IV 
concludes and argues that the theoretical framework has resonance beyond the case study of New 
Zealand by surveying recent empirical work on utility privatization.  
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II. A New Institutional Approach to Regulatory Design 
Background: ‘The Institutions and Governance of Economic Reform' 
Williamson (1996) claims that the macro approach of centralized planning and targeting 
of accounting aggregates has been largely discredited. In its place, has emerged a more 
microeconomic approach based on liberalization, deregulation and privatization. More recently 
the importance of the precondition of an institutional environment that supports the market forms 
of organization implicit in this viewpoint has reigned ascendant. Williamson argues for a more 
microanalytic approach in which the concern over property rights is supplemented by an analysis 
of the optimal governance mechanisms for private sector transactions. In the context of utility 
privatization, the choice between contract and legislation based regulation may be as important 
for the long-term performance of the enterprise as the choice to privatize. 
Neoclassical/Neoliberal Policy Reform: Getting the Prices Right 
The neoclassical or neoliberal recipe for economic reform includes a hard budget 
constraint, alignment of spending priorities with economic returns, tax efficiency, financial and 
trade liberalization including a lifting of any restrictions on foreign direct investment, 
deregulation and privatization and the establishment of secure private property rights. Of these 
six recommendations, five can be summarized in the prescription: ‘get the prices right.’ By 
eliminating politically imposed constraints on development and improving transparency and 
accountability, the government frees economic actors to seek economic returns. Tremendous 
gains have been realized from stabilization and reform programs across Latin America and 
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around the world that have followed this simple dictum (Little et. al., 1993; Williamson, 1994; 
and World Bank, 1995). Rampant inflation has been controlled, substantial one-time efficiency 
gains have been made in state-owned, regulated and privatized enterprises, new markets have 
been created and investor confidence restored. Earlier interest in alternative forms of business-
government relations characterized by closer and more informal personal ties (Amsden, 1989; 
Wade, 1990; World Bank, 1993 and Nelson, 1996) have waned in the onset of the Mexican debt 
crisis of 1995 and the East Asian crisis of 1997-98. 
The Impossibility of Selective Intervention: Getting the Property Rights Right 
However, a growing consensus is emerging around the hypothesis that getting the prices 
right is a necessary but not sufficient condition for successful state sector reform. Political 
institutions are increasingly accepted as crucial determinants of economic outcomes (North, 
1991; Williamson, 1996; and Henisz, 1998). One institution that is commonly cited as having a 
tremendous economic impact is that of private property. Regardless of how carefully we design 
contracts and incentives, we should not expect state-owned enterprises to be able to replicate the 
performance of a privatized counterpart. The rationale follows Williamson’s (1985) impossibility 
of selective ownership argument by claiming that public ownership is unable to control agency 
costs as effectively as the private sector model. While both governance structures face positive 
transaction costs, agency problems and complex internal contracts, the institutional arrangement 
for mitigating these problems varies widely across organizational form. In the private sector, the 
dilemma posed by the separation of ownership and control is dealt with through the discipline of 
the sharemarket, market for corporate control, monitoring by bondholders, expert board of 
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directors, managerial labor market, mutual monitoring by managers, threat of bankruptcy and 
competition in product markets (Jennings and Cameron, 1987). 
In the public sector, each of these avenues is severely constrained. Outputs are often sold 
in non-competitive or tightly regulated markets. There often exists at least an implicit 
government bailout guarantee that eliminates or reduces the threat of bankruptcy. Most 
importantly, while both private sector shareholders and voters (the implicit shareholders of state-
owned enterprises) have incentives to free ride and must bear some costs to become informed, 
the existence of a market for ownership provides a small number of entrepreneurial capitalists the 
incentive to overcome these costs and reap financial gain by trading until the share price reflects 
the net present value of expected future returns. Furthermore, board members can use the share 
price as a relatively low cost measure of managerial performance and, assuming they hold an 
equity stake in the firm, they have an incentive to replace managers in whom the markets place 
low confidence. Thus every management decision in a state-owned enterprise including pricing, 
production, marketing and diversification is subjected to reduced scrutiny giving managers 
greater discretion to pursue their own independent objective functions. 
Despite any formal establishment of independent rights and responsibilities, incentive 
contracts, reporting requirements and operating independence, state owned enterprises remain 
subject to continued bureaucratic discretion and political intervention. As stressed by Weingast 
(1995), the establishment of formal property rights does not automatically create market 
incentives nor provide a credible commitment against expropriation or strategic action by the 
government. Those incentives are dependent on the incentives of individual economic actors and 
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those rights must be self-enforcing for a credible commitment to obtain. State owned enterprises, 
however independently constituted or separated from political control, remain the property of the 
state as represented by elected public officials. They will, as such, unavoidably be more 
conscious or made more conscious of political and social constraints crucial to the reelection of 
the party in power. This may include, but is not limited to, price restraint, hiring policies, or 
cultural values. Policymakers who fail to impose these political or social objectives on the 
enterprises face the possible recrimination of the voters. 
The Institutional Environment and Regulatory Governance: A Microanalytic Approach 
The distinction between public and private ownership neglects important categories of 
intermediate governance mechanisms. The new institutional approach to regulatory governance 
enriches the framework offered by the property rights school in isolation by arguing that each 
regulatory governance structure offers distinct costs and competencies under various 
combinations of the institutional environment and transactional characteristics.  
Before setting out the theoretical framework some clarification of terms is in order. First, 
following Levy and Spiller (1994) the institutional environment is characterized by 
(1) The existence of an independent, non-corrupt and respected judiciary. 
(2) The number of checks and balances on executive power including a Constitution,  
democratic elections, multiple chambers of Parliament, multiple levels of 
government, and international constraints. 
 
Second, regulatory governance may either be administrative (ranging from reliance on 
competition law to various forms of extended regulatory contracts based on easily observable 
indicators such as RPI-X); legislative (legislated rules and procedures based on more difficult to 
observe constructs such as cost or allowable returns); or the enterprise may remain state-owned 
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organized as either a state-owned enterprise (with de jure operating independence) or government 
department (under explicit political control). 
In order to create incentives for private agents to invest, Levy and Spiller (1994) argue 
that governments must craft discriminating alignments of their regulatory mechanisms and the 
institutional environment. They warn that if regulatory mechanisms (specific/flexible 
rules/legislation) are incorrectly aligned, a credible commitment will not obtain and "efforts at 
privatization may end in disappointment, recrimination, and in resurgent demands for 
renationalization." 
In the absence of an independent judiciary (one whose authority over contracts between 
private or private and public entities is not subject to political intervention), governments are 
unable to credibly commit without external assistance. Any promise, legislation, contract or rule 
can be reneged upon without recourse of an appeal to an independent party. Such societies which 
include absolutist monarchies, centrally planned economies and single party totalitarian states 
can be characterized by Louis XIV’s famous dictum “L’Etat c’est moi” (I am the state). The 
existence of an independent judiciary gives citizens and firms an independent forum to which 
they can appeal arbitrary, capricious or self-serving rulings by the state and whose rulings they 
can have confidence will be enforced by that state. Levy and Spiller posit that, in the absence of 
judicial independence, efforts at establishing judicial reform should precede efforts at 
privatization or, if privatization must be enacted for political reasons, governments should rely 
on third party commitment mechanisms such as provided by international institutions.  
Given the presence of an independent judiciary, the next relevant variable is the extent to 
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which the government in power is unified across various branches (unicameral vs. bicameral 
legislature, federalist vs. centralized, parliamentary vs. presidential, etc.). Governments that face 
limited internal constraints can quickly overturn past legislation making that mechanism 
insufficient for the provision of a credible commitment. Instead they should adopt an 
administrative or rules based approach that can produce commitment through contract. Divided 
governments may, by contrast, rely more on more flexible enabling legislation rather than 
administrative procedures. The authors go on to demonstrate that the evidence of the 
performance of privatized telecommunications companies in Argentina, Chile, Jamaica, the 
Philippines, the United Kingdom is consistent with the above theory.  
By contrast, Heller and McCubbins (1996) claim that judicial independence is not a 
prerequisite for successful privatization but that institutional environments which provide regime 
stability (through unity of purpose or, more commonly, separation of powers) and regulatory 
predictability (through regulatory rules and procedures) can foster private sector investment with 
stable prices and sustainable profits in the utility sector. The authors successfully apply this 
framework to the cases of the privatization of electric utilities in Chile and Argentina. 
The two frameworks are broadly consistent. As regime stability weakens, which both 
authors define as a function of some constraints on executive discretion, credible commitments 
are increasingly difficult to fashion. The contribution of the Heller and McCubbins paper is 
noting that increasing the specificity of rules or legislation can compensate for increased 
uncertainty in judicial outcomes. Spiller and Vogelsang (1996) and the case study of New 
Zealand’s utility privatization presented in this paper present the complementary argument: 
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increasing the independence of the judiciary can compensate for a paucity of formal constraints 
on executive discretion by relying on contract and competition law. 
The two institutional environments under consideration present different hazards to 
contracting parties. These hazards are best mitigated using alternative regulatory governance 
mechanisms. Countries in which one government can unilaterally overturn the policies of its 
predecessor, such as Westminster Parliamentary systems, should rely as heavily as possible on 
the institutional framework of contract law in which the private property rights of the utility are 
as carefully specified as possible even at the risk of lost flexibility. These rights may then be 
protected by the courts without concern over regulatory uncertainty. By contrast, in institutional 
environments in which the judiciary is less likely to rule against the government in a politically 
sensitive dispute or one in which uncertainty is high due to corruption or lack of competence, 
judicial discretion should be narrowly delimited through the use of a highly specific rules-based 
approach to regulation with multiple checks and balances.3 In each case regulatory design 
maximizes the extent to which the government, given its constellation of institutional 
environment parameters, can provide a credible commitment not to intervene in the day-to-day 
operations of the privatized utility.  
Countries unable to provide credible commitment through either judicial enforcement or 
credible regulatory rules and procedures will likely benefit from retaining state ownership of 
these enterprises until such commitments may be fashioned. Countries able to draw upon both 
types of commitment mechanisms require an extension of this analytic framework. 
In these cases, one must also consider variation in the transaction to be regulated. 
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Following Williamson (1996), contracting hazards vary depending on the value of the asset in its 
next best use or asset specificity, the frequency with which the transaction occurs, the uncertainty 
surrounding the transaction, and the demand for probity (Williamson, 1999) in supply. Limiting 
analysis to the first and last considerations, when asset specificity is high, given the incomplete 
nature of contracts presumed by the behavioral assumptions of bounded rationality (“intendedly 
rational, but only limitedly so” (Simon, 1961)) and opportunism (“self-interest seeking with 
guile” (Williamson, 1996)), the potential for hold-up in market exchange increases. Above some 
threshold, the hazards to simple spot market exchange will be too large to bear and the 
transaction will be brought under a more formal governance mechanism such as a long-term 
contract, joint venture, or common ownership. The demand for probity imposes a cost 
disadvantage on private forms of provision due to the perception of illicit profits or conflicting 
objectives. 
As contracting costs increase based on transactional characteristics, the implicit 
regulatory contract necessary to sustain the transaction in the private sector becomes increasingly 
costly to support. Levy and Spiller (1994) convincingly argue that utilities are the prototypical 
high cost transaction. They provide highly political services (high demand for probity), using 
technologies characterized by economies of scale and scope (small number bargaining reducing 
value of asset in next best use), and requiring large sunk investments (high asset specificity). 
However, within the utility industry there remain a wide range of differentiated transactions 
which vary in their transactional characteristics. Thus in countries in which the institutional 
environment provided little clear guidance as to the optimal regulatory framework or for 
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transactions in which the hazards are especially high, a more microanalytic analysis of the 
specific transaction, the hazard it poses and the regulatory governance mechanisms available to 
mitigate that hazard is called for. The following section provides an example of the application of 
the above outlined New Institutional Approach to state sector reform including such a 
microanalytic analysis of the New Zealand utility sector. 
 
III. A Case Study of New Zealand State Owned Enterprises. 
Institutional Background 
Before turning to the history of New Zealand’s state owned enterprise reform program, 
one must understand the institutional context in which these reforms took place and the 
constraints that this placed on the government. At first glance, New Zealand's institutional 
environment stands out as a polar case of a government unconstrained by institutions (Palmer, 
1987). "New Zealand is the most streamlined example of a Westminster Parliamentary 
democracy in the world" (Palmer, 1993). As a British colony, it inherited much of its institutional 
framework from the United Kingdom and has modified it to enhance Parliamentary power. 
Despite seemingly limited checks on government discretion in such a system, New Zealand’s 
tradition of judicial competence and independence still offered substantial guarantees for the 
sanctity of contract. Furthermore, the long history of respect for civil service had drawn a highly 
talented pool of economists and policymakers into government.  
Incentives and Corporatization 
In the 1981/82 fiscal year, New Zealand's state owned enterprises produced 11.5% of that 
  
 
12 
country's Gross Domestic Product, accounted for 20.9% of gross fixed capital formation and 
represented a consistent drain on government resources. In 1984, a new Labour Government 
entered office in the midst of a foreign exchange crisis that highlighted the century long relative 
decline of the New Zealand economy.4 Despite this long-term decline of the macroeconomy and 
the mounting evidence of micro-inefficiency (Palmer, 1986; Jennings and Cameron, 1987; Spicer 
et. al., 1991; and Birchfied and Grant, 1993), wholesale reform of state owned enterprises was by 
no means foreshadowed by the incoming Labour government whose platform pledged only the 
introduction of more market forces into government operations to improve efficiency (Boston, 
1987).  
The Labour government’s early efforts (1984-1986) were true to their platform. They 
reconstituted the trading operations of government departments as state owned enterprises with 
commercial objectives and incentives. The government's aim, in the words of one interviewee, 
was to create "companies in drag." This meant giving managers a target rate of return and full 
autonomy on input, pricing and marketing decision. Managers could thus be evaluated on 
commercial performance compared with a corporate plan. Any noncommercial objectives would 
be achieved through a government contract with an “independent” though government owned 
entity rather than internally by fiat. Financing would have to be obtained on the financial markets 
and dividends would have to be paid to the government shareholder (Minister of Finance, 1985). 
Regulations were streamlined (Auditor General of Canada, 1994) and free entry and competition 
were to be introduced where possible (Duncan and Bollard, 1992).
The final step in the corporatization process involved the passage of the State Owned 
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Enterprise Act in September 1986. It defined the principal objective of 15 newly created state 
owned enterprises as "a successful business" itself defined by: 
being (a) as profitable and efficient as comparable businesses that are not owned by the 
Crown; and (b) a good employer; and (c) an organization that exhibits a sense of social 
responsibility by having regard to the interests of the community in which it operates and 
by endeavoring to accommodate or encourage these when able to do so (New Zealand 
Government, 1995). 
 
being a good employer was itself defined by operating 
a personnel policy containing provisions generally accepted as necessary for the fair and 
proper treatment of employees in all aspects of their employment, including provisions 
requiring -- (a) good and safe working conditions; and (b) an equal opportunities 
employment program; and (c) the impartial selection of suitably qualified persons for 
appointment; and (d) opportunities for enhancement of the abilities of individual 
employees (New Zealand Government, 1995). 
 
The State Owned Enterprise Act also attempted to work around the ownership problem 
by crafting an alternate monitoring scheme to proxy for the absence of a sharemarket. The typical 
private sector scheme was modified under the recognition that private sector firms face very 
different incentives than state owned enterprises. First, private firms have an incentive to provide 
information and set dividends to attract private investment while state owned enterprises can also 
rely on government funding. Second, private firms are more profit oriented while publicly owned 
firms likely have broader objectives. Third, the Board of Directors and senior management of 
private firms typically have remuneration packages that are more correlated with firm 
performance than is possible in the public sector. The resulting four part incentive scheme 
attempted to correct for these differences by mandating information flows, insuring action by 
Ministers when performance fell below targeted levels and insuring that these performance levels 
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were not set too low. It included annual negotiations between Boards and Ministers on 
Statements of Corporate Intent that included performance targets, dividend policy and capital 
requirements; regular reporting requirements by state owned enterprises that included formal 
business plans, operating budgets, board papers, accounts, balance sheets and performance 
measures; procedures for evaluating alternate courses of action to be taken by Ministers when 
performance lags including the hiring of independent consultants; and periodic review of state 
owned enterprises to revalue assets thus insuring optimal asset management. 
The Impossibility of Selective Intervention 
Despite remarkable initial performance improvements causing it to be heralded as a 
design breakthrough, "the solution for state owned enterprise" (McKinlay, 1987), and a credible 
third-way between government department and privatization, corporatization was not a long term 
solution capable of providing private sector levels of efficiency in the public sector. The State 
Owned Enterprise Act itself encapsulates the tensions in this goal predicted by property rights 
theory and by the Treasury (Cameron and Duignan, 1984).  
In a court case decided by the UK Privy Council, the requirement that state owned 
enterprises be good employers and behave socially responsibly were held to be of equal weight as 
the profitability and efficiency objective heralded by the government. While shareholders or 
stakeholders may place pressures on private sector firms to work towards these general 
principles, no private sector firm would receive a court mandate forcing them to give equal 
weight to these objectives and a profit motive. Similarly, no private sector firm faces mandatory 
reporting requirements as strenuous as those imposed on state owned enterprises and, more 
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importantly, no such firm has to negotiate anything as onerous as a statement of corporate intent. 
This allows the shareholding Minister to impose dividend levels, the nature and scope of 
operations, the objectives of the enterprise, accounting policies, performance targets, and 
additional information requirements. While these divergences from private sector practice are 
necessitated by the divergences in incentives outlined above, they necessarily disadvantage state 
owned enterprises in competition with their private sector competitors. 
At this point, the debate refocused on the question of ownership that had earlier been set 
aside. There was an increasing recognition by various government actors that corporatization was 
a second best policy solution that could improve upon the performance of government 
departments but would be unlikely to approach levels of efficiency seen in the private sector. In 
fact, opportunistic behavior by state owned enterprise managers and government Ministers 
conspired to keep this system from operating at peak efficiency.  
The Controller and Auditor General found that the corporatized firms did not meet the 
accountability requirements established by the State Owned Enterprise Act (Controller and 
Auditor General, 1988 and 1990 and State Owned Enterprises Committee, 1990). Managers not 
surprisingly withheld that information that would be useful in developing sanctions against them. 
Statements of corporate intent were seen as superficial: corporate objectives were defined in 
philosophical rather than measurable terms; the scope of activity to be undertaken was vaguely 
specified; and performance measures were generally viewed as inadequate. Reporting 
requirements were often ignored and data was withheld due to "commercial sensitivity." 
Furthermore, this second best proxy would continue to deteriorate in performance relative to the 
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private sector, unless its assets were reevaluated periodically by externally contracted consultants 
to insure against degradation or excessive risk exposure.  
Ministerial opportunism also occurred taking the form of de facto expropriation. One of 
the first instances of political interference in the operation of a state owned enterprise occurred in 
the establishment of Television New Zealand's Statement of Corporate Intent. Attempts to force 
the inclusion of the objective "promote New Zealand's culture and identity" were derided by 
Treasury in the strongest possible language: 
[this would] reduce profits, reduce revenues to the Crown, reduce new asset value, and 
thus contravene the State Owned Enterprise Act. Even more fundamentally, this policy 
would so confuse the company's goals that it would be impossible to assess its 
performance objectively - effectively a return to the situation which prevailed under the 
former Broadcasting Company of New Zealand when there was confusion between social 
and commercial objectives and continuing arguments about financial structure and 
performance (Treasury analysis, cited in Spicer, Emanuel and Powell, 1993). 
 
Similar controversy surrounded the Labour Party's 1989 campaign announcement lowering 
mortgage interest rates (a power supposedly held by the corporatized Housing Corporation) so as 
"to help to reinforce the general decline in interest rates" (New Zealand Herald, 8/25/89 cited in 
New Zealand Business Roundtable, 1992). 
The most egregious political intervention occurred in 1991 when the Government 
disapproved a rate increase of 2.9% contravening an earlier agreement with Electricity 
Corporation of New Zealand. In the words of CEO John Fernyough 
there is in my view no possibility that any future ECNZ Board will attempt to increase 
prices without full Cabinet approval and backing. Effectively, this means that electricity 
prices are now politically controlled (Spicer, Emmanuel and Powell, 1993). 
 
This opinion was confirmed when in 1992, two shareholding Ministers told the board of the 
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corporation that the government would accept lower rates of return to accommodate a pricing 
strategy that would not defer economic recovery and that was consistent with economic growth 
(New Zealand Business Roundtable: NZBR, 1992). 
The Government's commitment to provide no financial bailouts was also tested and found 
wanting. New Zealand Rail, Radio New Zealand, Government Property Services, the Bank of 
New Zealand and the Development Finance Corporation all received substantial cash infusions 
from the Government (NZBR, 1992). Similar bailouts and restructurings were implemented on 
New Zealand Steel, Shipping Corporation and Petroleum Corporation (NZBR, 1988). 
The corporatization experimented rested on the assumption that state owned enterprises 
could mimic the high powered incentive scheme of the private sector while remaining under state 
ownership. The State Owned Enterprise Act attempted to construct a new organizational form 
that would include the monitoring and incentive gains provided by a sharemarket without selling 
shares. It set the benchmark for comparison for performance at the level of private sector 
corporations and expected simultaneous adherence to good employer rules, social responsibility 
requirements, more stringent reporting requirements and equity concerns. This conflict between 
these private and public objectives placed inherent stress on the corporatized firms. Given that 
the state retained ownership and that contracts are necessarily incomplete (Williamson, 1985), it 
was impossible to fully recreate private sector incentives for residual ownership rights remained 
in the hands of the public sector.   
While, these faults would prevent corporatized enterprises from attaining private sector 
levels of performance, they may have facilitated the process of privatization. While government 
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pronouncements cast serious doubt on the accusations that privatization was the intended goal 
from the start, corporatization did ease the process of asset valuation and separation of 
commercial from non-commercial activities. 
Privatization 
In the end, the argument that apparently swayed the politicians and, possibly, the 
electorate in favor of privatization was one that had been voiced earlier but viewed as a benefit 
from though not a cause for privatization: debt reduction. By couching the argument in these 
terms, the inherent weaknesses of state ownership were obscured. Some combination of the 
increasing evidence of flaws in the state owned enterprise model and this newly highlighted 
benefit of transfer to the private sector5 allowed Douglas to cross the political watershed in 1987 
(Treasury, 1987; Minister of Finance, 1987) and expand the scope of the privatization program in 
1988. 
The National Party returned to power in 1990 after six years in opposition and further 
accelerated the pace of the privatization program (see Table 1) while also expanding upon the 
theoretical framework in one important regard. Based either on the lessons of previous 
government bailouts or a richer appreciation of the hazards involved, the Government analyzed 
the potential for ex post opportunism by managers of privatized firms that retained some social 
or political objectives. The government now recognized that even the transfer of residual 
ownership rights could not remove all government obligations so long as the privatized 
corporation retained some public obligations. It pledged to create “a clear-cut regulatory 
framework” to “allow the new owners to plan with certainty” and to transfer the responsibility for 
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“any Government policy objectives that might have been set for the businesses” to the core 
public sector (Treasury, 1990). While this was an important step forwards, it failed to develop a 
framework that would signal when such hazards are likely to be especially important implying 
that a return to political control or the crafting of an alternate institutional framework should be 
preferred to privatization for some subset of transactions. 
The Special Problem of Utilities 
The reform of two state owned enterprises in particular bedeviled the National 
Government. The experiences of New Zealand Telecommunications and Electricity Corporation 
of New Zealand illustrate the types of transactions that, as argued by Levy and Spiller (1996), are 
most apt to create opportunistic hazards when organized through the market. While most state 
owned enterprises were primarily engaged in transactions of low/moderate asset specificity 
(printing, property management, construction, media, airlines, energy, and banking), 
telecommunications and electricity were characterized by substantially greater transaction costs 
due to the politicized nature of the market, likelihood of small numbers bargaining given 
economies of scale and scope and the need for large non-redeployable investments.  
Given the New Zealand government's inability to commit not to intervene in any 
traditional regulatory governance structure for the utilities (a potential de facto expropriation by 
the state), private monopolies would either have to be offered rates or return that would yield 
political acrimony or be so tightly regulated as to offer little efficiency gain over their 
continuation as government departments. Debate continued for years after the passage of the 
State Owned Enterprise Act 1986 on a breakup of the previously state owned monopolies that 
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would create a competitive market that would discipline these firms under a light-handed 
regulatory approach. Partly because of New Zealand's small size (long distance and local calls 
were routed through the same switches resident in Telecom headquarters (Treasury, 1989c and 
1989d)) and unique dependence on hydroelectric power (requiring coordination across different 
dams, levies and river systems (Electricity Distribution Reform Unit, 1991)), there was the 
perception that no breakup of Telecom or Electricorp could be designed that accomplished these 
ends.  
Telecom was eventually privatized as a monopoly regulated primarily by the threat of 
competition which, in fact, did emerge quite rapidly. However, overcapacity in electrical 
generation made the initial threat of potential competition quite remote for Electricorp stymieing 
government efforts at privatization. In both cases, the difficulties encountered by the government 
were centered on the polar case of the utilities problem outlined above, the problem of access to 
essential facilities or interconnection.  
Competition for telecommunication services is greatly facilitated when competing 
networks are able to interconnect so that users of one service have access to all other users. 
However, Telecom had a strong advantage in any negotiations for interconnection as it owned the 
only local network that reached 100% of customers. The first major entrant into the 
telecommunications market, Clear Communications Ltd., claimed that Telecom's pricing of 
interconnection was neither "fair" nor "reasonable" and violated Section 36 of the Commerce Act 
of 1986 because Telecom used its market power in an anticompetitive manner to maintain its 
dominant position and protect monopoly rents. In a case that reached the Privy Council of the 
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House of Lords in London, Clear's argument was largely dismissed. In December 1995, after 
over five years of negotiation, an interconnection agreement was finally reached. The terms of 
that agreement have not been publicly released and Clear continues to protest claiming it had no 
choice but to sign a biased accord. BellSouth has not yet reached an accord with Telecom and has 
made clear its reluctance to sign a similar agreement. 
Policymakers faced a difficult decision. Telecom demanded reimbursement for the 
politically necessary Kiwi share and allowance for a competitive rate of return on a highly 
specific fixed investment.6 Clear's arguments seem equally persuasive. Telecom can be expected 
to behave opportunistically and thus threaten the competitive returns on investment in competing 
infrastructure and new services made by entrants. 
The Government did warn that failure to balance these claims in private negotiation could 
lead to a reconsideration of the light-handed regulatory approach initially favored. In 1989, 
Treasury noted that as Telecom's management favored privatization, they were currently on their 
best behavior. However, while current interconnection proposals seemed "fair and reasonable", 
they were "untested by actual operating experience." (Treasury, 1989c emphasis in original) 
Though initially hopeful that further action would be unnecessary, the Government, frustrated by 
the lengthy, acrimonious and politically damaging negotiation process, published a barely veiled 
warning to Telecom in August 1995 to expedite the process. That document failed to reach a 
conclusion regarding the merits of a revision to the existing regulatory structure but did call for 
public comment on the matter and promised to evaluate its options surrounding "price restraints 
on access or interconnection to the natural monopoly facility" (Treasury and Ministry of 
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Commerce, 1995). Despite the signing of an interconnection agreement by Clear, the final 
outcome of this debate is still uncertain. The political controversy surrounding the negotiations 
demonstrates the hazard of opportunistic manipulation of the political process by both entrants 
and incumbents even in a light-handed regulatory regime.  
Despite the long-standing interconnection battle, New Zealand Telecommunications was 
privatized and does now compete with Clear and BellSouth in long distance and some local 
markets. The reform of the former Electricity Division of the Ministry of Energy took an almost 
entirely converse course. While reforms in the sectors of electricity supply and distribution have 
been impressive, proposals to create a competitive generation sector in private hands remain, as 
of yet, unfulfilled.  
The center of the controversy was, again, interconnection to the transmission network. 
Given the lack of potential private competition, the government attempted to at least avoid the 
concentration of monopoly power of generation and transmission in a single entity by 
establishing a private club ownership for the national power grid divided between generators, 
distributors and, under some proposals, private investors. However, due to concern surrounding 
the market power held by the dominant state owned generating company, the distributors resisted 
and ultimately succeeded in defeating this reform proposal. Reform efforts did not begin again in 
earnest until supply shortages in the summer of 1992.  
Since then, substantial progress has been made in the retailing or local supply sector and 
in the creation for a spot market for electricity. The 48 local Electrical Supply Authorities (ESA) 
were corporatized in 1993 with the intent that they would be privatized. In 1994, ECNZ’s high 
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voltage transmission business was separated into an independent state-owned enterprise with the 
intention of creating a common carrier for a competitive generation sector. As of 1996, despite 
the fact that only 9 ESAs have sold even a minority of their shares to customers with control 
remaining with the local council or a community trust and that generation remains a state-owned 
oligopoly (30% of ECNZ’s generating capacity having been split off to form the independent 
state owned enterprise CONTACT that may be privatized in 1999), the desired competition has 
begun to emerge.  
Since 1994, all customers have had the right to purchase electricity from any supply 
company. In that same year, the Electricity Marketing Company (EMCO) was set up as a joint 
venture between ECNZ, Trans Power and the national association of ESAs with the task of 
creating a wholesale market for electricity. The institutional design of EMCO incorporated many 
lessons from the failed attempt to set up a club ownership of the transmission grid. Voting rights 
are divided equally between buyers and sellers to reflect the fact that, unlike financial markets, 
market participants tend to play one or the other role but rarely both. No one entity is permitted 
more than 45% of within class voting shares so although ECNZ has 72% of the generating 
capacity it has 45% of producer votes equal to the share of CONTACT which has 22% of 
national generating capacity. Furthermore, a majority of both buyers and sellers is required to 
pass any changes in the rules regulating the market. 
Initially, EMCO focussed on transparency in price setting by publishing weekly updates 
on the process used by ECNZ to determine prices. In 1995, the cap was removed on the spot 
market for electricity and government support for a light-handed regulatory approach was 
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reiterated. Since October 1, 1996, prices have been set by a computer-based trading and 
information system developed from the foreign exchange room system used by major banks 
around the world based on bids between buyers and sellers for 30 minute blocks of electricity at 
200 entry or exit points along the national grid (Bollard and Pickford, 1996). A recent study by 
Bergara and Spiller (1997) using data disclosed under the light-handed regulatory system finds 
that relatively high-cost suppliers in urban or industrial areas tend to distribute the electricity of 
others suggesting that market forces are having an important impact relatively rapidly.  
The distinct reform paths taken by these two utility sectors under comparable institutional 
regimes of light-handed regulation highlight the importance of transactional characteristics to the 
determination of an optimal regulatory governance mechanism. In the case of electricity, despite 
the difficulty in transferring the generating sector to private control, interconnection was 
achieved with little acrimony and a functioning spot market for power has developed. By 
contrast, despite the emergence of a competitive telecommunications service sector, 
interconnection remains highly contentious. Electricity may have proceeded further due to the 
homogeneous nature of the product that creates more reciprocity between different network 
owners and eases the burden of information disclosure requirements. Additionally, after 
corporatization and deregulation of the 48 Electricity Supply Authorities, there existed a 
competitive downstream market. By contrast, telecommunication services are heterogeneous, 
bundled and sold directly to the consumer across a participant-owned and currently monopolistic 
infrastructure. 
In both cases, after substantial delay, trial and error and acrimony, prices were reduced, 
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service reliability improved and competition enhanced. Progress in competition was greatest 
where contracting costs were minimized. For transactions in which, due to technological or 
political constraints, small numbers bargaining over the returns on non-redeployable assets was 
subject to political intervention, progress was limited. By contrast, where competitive suppliers 
could emerge and safeguard the hazards in their exchange through contract or reciprocal 
arrangements, gains were the greatest. It is not possible, in hindsight, to assess whether more or 
better reforms were theoretically possible but only to compare feasible alternative institutional 
structures. Given gains to consumer and producer surplus in both sectors (Boles de Boer and 
Evans, 1994 and Culy, Read and Wright, 1996) since 1984 and likely gains of dynamic 
efficiency, there is little doubt that New Zealand succeeded on this score. 
 
IV. Conclusions and Further Applications in the International Context 
The New Institutional Approach to state sector reform presented in Section II allows for a 
better understanding of the successes and failures of New Zealand’s state-owned enterprise 
reforms as well as the construction of a set of recommendations for future reform efforts. Until 
the 1993 electoral reform, New Zealand's government was constrained from arbitrary or 
opportunistic behavior only by the independence and professionalism of the judiciary, the strong 
administrative capabilities of the civil service, and informal societal norms that constrained 
excessive behavior. While such a framework offered substantial guarantees against arbitrary 
administrative or judicial expropriation of private assets, legislated reforms lacked credibility due 
to the ease with which the present or any future government could overturn past law.7 
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The extended agency theory based experiment with corporatization of state owned 
enterprises, despite initial efficiency gains, failed to yield private sector levels of efficiency or 
produce the sustained dynamic efficiency gains hoped for. Political intervention became 
increasingly common and disclosure standards frequently evaded. In response to these 
shortcomings and new theoretical insights from the property rights school, state-owned 
enterprises that were seen as operating in competitive, or at least contestable, markets were 
privatized while the remainder were brought back under increasingly direct state control (see 
Table 1). In those cases such as public utilities where contracting costs were extremely high, 
regulatory governance was structured around light-handed regimes that took advantage of New 
Zealand’s independent judiciary and minimized the dangers of regulatory uncertainty posed by its 
Westminster Parliamentary regime. 
 However, consistent with the lessons of transaction cost economics, the type of regulatory 
apparatus that was adopted differed substantially between the telecommunications and electricity 
sectors based on the unique technological, market and political characteristics of the two 
industries. An important lesson from this application of the new institutional approach to public 
sector reform is the need for a careful microanalytic analysis of the hazards to market exchange 
and from political intervention that characterize a specific regulated industry prior to the proposal 
of a specific sectoral reform program. Not only will the regulatory governance mechanism differ 
substantially across countries based on the institutional environment but it will also vary within a 
country across industries based on the specific hazards faced in market exchange. 
In a broader international context, the new institutional approach to public sector reform 
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developed here predicts that countries with relatively independent judiciaries but relatively few 
formal constraints on executive authority will rely on light handed regulation. Several recent case 
studies on the privatization of electricity and telecommunications firms support this claim. 
Spiller and Sampson (1996) and Spiller and Vogelsang (1996) document the use of contract law 
as a regulatory mechanism for the telecommunications sector in Jamaica and the United 
Kingdom which, like New Zealand, possess Westminster style Parliamentary democracies with 
relatively independent and autonomous, if circumscribed, judiciaries. Similar results are reported 
by Newbery and Green (1996) for electricity in the United Kingdom and by Hjalmarsson (1996) 
in Norway, Sweden and Finland. Countries with less developed judicial systems but a stronger 
set of checks and balances against executive discretion will tend to rely on highly specific 
regulatory rules and procedures. Such is the case for telecommunications (Galal, 1996 and Hill 
and Abdala, 1996) and electricity (Heller and McCubbins, 1997) in Chile and Argentina 
respectively. 
Countries lacking both commitment mechanisms are not expected to secure successful 
privatizations in high transaction cost industries unless they offer rates of returns which so high 
as to themselves raise concerns regarding the political sustainability of reforms. Most East and 
South Asian economies fall in this category and have tended to be characterized by acrimonious 
renegotiation of contracts with private sector providers earning what are perceived as 
supernormal profits (Enron in India), the use of build-own-transfer contracts that leave most of 
the non-commercial risk in the hands of the government (Philippines and Malaysia) or continued 
state ownership (Korea and Taiwan). 
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While the benefits of privatization have been well chronicled in numerous qualitative and 
quantitative empirical works, the appropriate framework for regulatory governance of industries 
with high contracting costs remains relatively poorly understood. Levy and Spiller (1996) posit 
the centrality of judicial independence while Heller and McCubbins (1996) stress regulatory rules 
and procedures. The New Zealand case study offered here provides additional evidence that at 
least two alternative paths to regulatory commitment likely exist. Countries with relative 
advantages in judicial independence should rely more heavily on competition law while those 
institutional environments with more formal internal checks and balances on executive discretion 
may benefit from developing regulatory rules and procedures that carefully delimit the range of 
executive and judicial discretion. In either case, a microanalytic focus on the sources of hazards 
in market exchange is required prior to the crafting of a public sector reform program that gets 
the prices, incentives, property rights and governance mechanisms right.
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Table 1: Reform of State-Owned Enterprises 
 
State Owned Enterprise   Activity    Status and Comments 
 
Corporate forms predating 1987 
New Zealand Steel   Steel production   Privatized (1988) 
New Zealand Railways Corporation Train, bus, ferry services  Privatized (1993), government retains ownership 
of land pending settlement of Waitangi claims 
Housing Corporation   Concessional mortgages and Approximately NZ$1.2b  
rental properties   mortgages privatized (1991-92) 
Development Finance Corporation  Development bank  Sold, under statutory management (1988) 
Bank of New Zealand   Trading bank   Privatized (1992) 
Air New Zealand, Ltd.   Domestic and Int'l air services Privatized (1989) 
Petroleum Corporation of New Zealand Oil and gas production  Privatized (1988) 
Tourist Hotel Corporation of New Zealand Hotels    Privatized (1990) 
Shipping Corporation of New Zealand Shipping Services  Privatized (1989-90) with partial payback (1993) 
Rural Bank    Agricultural bank   Privatized (1989 and 1992) 
 
Corporations established under 1987 act 
 
Airways Corporation of New Zealand Air traffic control   State owned enterprises (profits of $6m in 1994) 
Coal Corporation of New Zealand  Coal Mining   Settling ownership issues under Treaty of Waitangi 
Electricity Corporation of New Zealand Electricity generation  State owned enterprises   
TransPower    Electricity transmission  State owned enterprise (created 1994) 
Government Life Insurance Corporation Life Insurance   Now owned by policyholders 
Government Property Services  Government property holdings State owned enterprise (profits of $1.5m in 1994) 
Land Corporation   Government rural landholdings State owned enterprise (profits of $36m in 1994) 
$77m in mortgages sold in 1989-90 
New Zealand Forestry Corporation  Forests and sawmills  $887m of cutting rights privatized 
rest remain along with land as state owned enterprise 
New Zealand Post   Postal services   State owned enterprise (profits of $67m in 1994) 
Post Office Bank    Savings bank   Privatized (1989) 
Telecom Corporation   Telephone services  Privatized (1990) 
Works and Development Services Corp. Civil engineering   State owned enterprise (profits of $10m in 1994) 
Government Computing Services  Computer systems  Privatized (1994) 
Government Supply Brokerage Corp. Government purchasing company Privatized (1992) 
Radio New Zealand   National radio services  State owned enterprise (profits of $1.6m in 1994) 
Television New Zealand   Two national TV channels  State owned enterprise (profits of $33m in 1994) 
 
Uncorporatized bodies 
 
Health Computing Services  Health Computing  Privatized (1988) 
Government Print  Printing    Privatized (1990) 
National Film Unit   Film making   Sold to Television New Zealand 
Communicate New Zealand  Publicity services   Privatized (1990) 
 
SOURCE: Bollard (1992) and Treasury (1995c).
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1. See Williamson (1996). 
2. For a broader perspectives on the recent reforms Evans, Grimes, Teece and Wilkinson (1996). 
3. Schwartz, Spiller and Urbiztondo (1994) make a closely related argument in claiming that 
legislatures would want to pass highly specific rules vs. more general formulations when their 
preferences are intense, judicial uncertainty is high or the cost of reversing the courts is high. 
4. From 1870 to 1966, New Zealand ranked among the top five countries in the world in GDP 
per capita and was among the top three in most of those years. By 1984, they had fallen to 
fourteenth and would continue to drop to seventeenth in 1991 just ahead of Spain, Ireland and 
Portugal who, in 1870, had per capital income roughly half that of New Zealand. (Maddison, 
1995). 
5. Note that the state's balance sheet only improves after a privatization if the private sector is a 
more efficient manager of the assets than the public sector. Both an asset and liability are being 
removed from the government's accounts. Only if the sale price exceeds the discounted present 
value of the rents from continued state ownership will privatization aid in debt reduction.  
6. Telecom has claimed that it continues to provide a $NZ100-200m cross-subsidy to local access 
from business and international tolls. (Crook, 1995). 
7. The shift to a mixed member proportional system eliminated the virtually guaranteed single 
party majority provided by the Westminster system. Ironically, the new Parliament, though likely 
unable to push through substantial new reforms, will also have great difficulty in undoing prior 
reforms leading to an enshrinement of the status quo. 
